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Managing process safety risk in Natural Gas Liquid (NGL) plant is always a challenging task, 
especially when it comes to integrating the output of fire and explosion risk analysis into the detail 
design tasks. Some of which are  
 optimizing plant layout,  
 defining fire zones, emergency shutdown and blowdown scenarios for flare capacity, 
 laying out fire and gas detectors, action on confirm gas or fire detections, 
 locating emergency and blowdown valves,  
 arranging active fire protection on overall plot plan and processing units,  
 passive fire proofing on steel structures and vessels supports, 
 3D model review of safety systems. 
This paper will provide systematic approach of integrating process safety deliverables during detail 
design stages of the project and thereby demonstrating ALARP for the key design decision made 




The first and foremost thing in integrating process safety and risk studies is to define a robust 
project loss prevention philosophy clearly touching the subjects on how process safety will interact 
with other engineering disciplines, provide guidance that how risk and safety studies will be 
performed and integrated continuously when engineering work is begin performed. Process safety 
or technical safety team shall be fully aware of its important role on the project and coordinate 
with other engineering disciplines to provide proactive support and inputs to design development. 
This paper is concentrating on active involvement of process safety team on Natural Gas Liquid 
(NGL) Project during detail engineering phase. Since, gas processing plants are different than 
refinery process, where toxic and flammable risk imposes different pictures in terms of risk 
management. Such as, implying risk based approach in active and passive fire protection, process 
plant layout, understanding jet fire from high pressure gas release, pool fires from low pressure 
releases of cryogenic liquids and delayed ignition of gas cloud resulting into explosion 
overpressure in a congested areas of gas processing plant. 
Integrating Risk and Safety Deliverables 
During initial phase of the details engineering, loss prevention philosophy and plan shall define 
process safety guidelines and how process safety engineering work will be performed, including 
deliverables schedule, involvement of process safety team in several studies in risk identification 
and management. These primary and the most important documents shall be defined in much 
details so that it provides path forward for the entire phase of the project. Any changes in project 
loss prevention philosophy and plan shall be managed through proper channel or Management of 
Change Process. 
Developing process safety and risk deliverables schedules shall align with other engineering 
discipline deliverables (in terms of input or output). Process safety and risk schedule shall drive 
through entire project deliverables and activities to be performed either by process safety team or 
consultant. Outputs from risk and safety studies shall provide inputs to other engineering 
deliverables, design development and workshops such as Layout review, Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP), Safety Integrity Level (SIL)/Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) etc.  
Plot Plan Review 
Plot plan and site layout review initially involving multi-disciplinary engineers and inputs 
provided for the development of layout based on knowledge of fire and explosion risk, 
international guidelines for spacing processing units are valuable to optimize plant layout for 
further engineering work. 
  
Hazard Identification (HAZID) 
Hazard identification involving multi-disciplinary engineering team in a brain storming session 
provides comprehensive list of hazard identified from non-process and process areas of the NGL 
Plant. Further, identification of Major Accident Hazards (MAHs) becomes back-bone of 
developing Design Safety Case or Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) or Health, Safety, 
Environmental Impact Assessment (HSEIA) Report depending on corporate and regulatory 
requirements. Hazard identification provides scenarios to be considered in fire and explosion 
analysis and Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA).  
Fire and Explosion Analysis 
Fire and explosion analysis is normally performed by consultant using software to simulate impact 
for fire scenarios in each fire zone. In NGL plant predominant fire scenarios may be jet fire and 
flash fires, there is the potential for pool fires with low pressure releases of cryogenic liquids. 
Delayed ignition of gas cloud within congested process areas of the fire zone may generate 
significant explosion overpressure.  
The analysis shall provide information regarding worst case fire and explosion scenarios and 
impact zones/distances, risk contours for different radiations, overpressure risk contours for 
different pressure. Results of fire and explosion analysis shall be useful for defining fire zones on 
plot plan, relocating fire potential equipment, optimizing plant layout and distances between 
equipment, requirement for active and passive fire protection, minimizing escalation potential 
between equipment within the unit and escalation to other processing units.     
Flare radiation and flame out dispersion analysis is very important for location of flare in NGL 
Plant and is many times performed as part of fire and explosion analysis. Flare radiation for the 
worst case blowdown scenarios from the processing unit such as liquefaction unit of the NGL Plant 
is the governing case of flare design. Sterile zone around flare is defined based on these radiation 
analysis and API guidance. Location of tall structures, platforms shall have minimum impact from 
flare radiation where operating staff and equipment are exposed. Flame out condition of flare is 
another scenario for the worse case blowdown event to see if any heavy gases flammable 
concentration does not reach ground level or any elevated structures, platform and ignition sources. 
Fire and explosion analysis provides key input for defining fire zone on plot plan and firewater 
system design.   
Fire Zones 
Fire zones layouts for the facility are prepared for each process units based on separation distances 
between processing units using results of fire scenarios from fire and explosion analysis. These 
layouts are used for further detailed engineering work such firewater layouts drawings, firewater 
demand calculation and developing emergency shutdown and blowdown philosophy for fire 
scenarios in each fire zone.  
Firewater System Layouts  
Firewater System Layouts for entire facility including non-process and process areas are developed 
to fire fight different fire scenarios in each fire zone based on range of jet fires and pool fires 
identified from fire and explosion analysis, and NFPA requirements. Most fire scenarios in NGL 
Plant are gas fire with few pool fire scenarios from low pressure releases of cryogenic liquids, 
heavies and diesels fuel storage. Thus, the primary objective for firewater system is to prevent 
escalation between processing equipment within the unit and further escalation to other processing 
units. Deploying automated fire fighting system such as deluge spray system on process vessels 
and equipment is important where manual fire fighting is not possible. Above ground fire fighting 
equipment such as hydrant, monitors (with foam application where needed) and deluge spray 
system are best located based on fire scenarios and firewater coverage required.  
Firewater Demand 
Firewater demand is calculated based on firewater system layout showing above ground fire 
fighting equipment in each fire zone for effective fire fighting. Firewater demand is calculated for 
hydrocarbon pumps, tanks, vessel and equipment surface areas requiring fire water coverage in 
each fire zone based on NFPA requirements. The highest demand of firewater in any fire zone 
becomes the basis for designing firewater systems such as sizing firewater pumps, sizing firewater 
main and above ground fire fighting equipment.  
Fire Proofing 
Fire proofing schedule is developed based on fire potential equipment in compliance to API 2218 
and international standards. Fire proofing layouts are then later developed to provide extent of fire 
proofing requirements for steel structures and supports for vessels and equipment. Any additional 
requirement of fire proofing shall be looked at from fire and explosion analysis based on risk 
contours for 37.5 kW/m2 radiation at frequency of 10-4/yr. Thus applying risk based approach for 
fireproofing requirement is a key aspect for minimizing escalation potential in NGL Plant. 
Hazardous Area Classification 
Hazardous area classification schedule and layouts are the primary requirement for classification 
of electrical equipment within the process units and fire zones for better ignition control. Thus, 
hazardous area classifications are key specification for the design requirement of electrical 
equipment, cables, terminal/junction box, pump motors etc.  
Fire and Gas Detection 
Fire and gas detection layout in NGL Plant is developed preliminary based on fire and gas detection 
philosophy. The hydrocarbon and toxic (if required) gas detectors layout shall cover each 
equipment, pumps, vessels and leak sources within each fire zones. Gas detectors layouts shall 
cover entire fire zone with point type and open path detectors in combination for appropriate voting 
logic for executive action. Similarly, fire / flame detectors shall be provided with fire zone covering 
equipment, vessels, pumps for confirmed fire detection and executive action required for 
emergency shutdown and blowdown.  
3D Mapping of fire and gas detectors for effective coverage is very important in any fire zone of 
NGL Plant, especially to optimize fire and gas detectors 2D layouts initially developed. Based on 
experience for onshore NGL Projects, target confirmed fire and gas detection coverage of 90% for 
alarm (1ooN detection); and 85% for control/executive action (2ooN detection) are commonly 
used. Emergency shutdown and blowdown for each fire zone and overall NGL Plant is to minimize 
fire and explosion risk and to prevent escalation. Confirmed gas detection to isolate/shutdown 
process units and/or overall NGL Plant, and confirmed fire detection to staggered 
blowdown/depressurized process units and overall NGL Plant within flare capacity are considered, 
with few exceptions of some essential units for emergency services in place. Blowdown scenarios 
from liquefaction unit and upstream gas processing units of NGL Plant are further studied in detail 
to define governing cases for the design of flare capacity and also to build logic for staggered 
blowdown from NGL Plant.  
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
There are several expectations by the project team form Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for 
the NGL Plant. This study normally performed by risk and safety consultant provides inputs to 
important mitigation measures for the safety of operating staff and surrounding public populations. 
Governing scenarios contributing to individual and societal risk are discussed thoroughly in this 
report, mitigation measures are identified and further ALARP demonstration performed. Thus, 
QRA help to improve decision-making process by highlighting the scenarios that contribute most 
to overall risk on NGL Project. Focusing on these helps to meet project risk tolerability criteria 
and demonstrate that risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
ALARP Demonstration 
ALARP demonstration is a continual exercise which process safety team need to perform. ALARP 
demonstration can be based on standards, guidelines, qualitative or quantitative methods to justify 
that through assessment is performed for making any decision or changes during detail engineering 
phase of the NGL Project. Documenting ALARP demonstration and decision made is the key 
aspect of Process Safety Management (PSM).  
RAM AnalysisReliability Availability and Maintainability (RAM) analysis provides production 
availability of NGL plant to meet desired production capacity considering availability of process 
equipment. There are not much of process safety inputs to the RAM Analysis. However, it provides 
insight of criticality of system and equipment from production point of view. RAM analysis for 
NGL plant covers interfaces, such as availability of upstream gas supply and downstream Cracker 
Plant.   
Occupational Health Risk Assessment (OHRA) 
Occupational Health Risk Assessment (OHRA) is a qualitative brain storming exercise to identify 
health risk during construction and normal operation phase of NGL project. OHRA reports 
provides list of actions to minimize health impact on construction and operating personnel. 
Appropriate measures are taken prior to performing hazardous activities. Requirement of medical 
facilities such as clinic, ambulance, trained doctors and nurse, medicine, medical evacuation means 
are the key requirements for NGL Plant located in a remote area. Health risk assessment is one of 
the elements of HSEIA report normally submitted to governing authority of the region for an 
approval of the project.  
Bow Ties Analysis  
Bow ties development for identified Major Accident Hazard (MAHs) during HAZID are further 
studies in a qualitative brain storming session with multi-disciplinary engineering team to identify 
preventive and mitigating barriers of the top event. Engineering team provides inputs to bow ties 
development with barriers in place as part of engineering for NGL Plant. Barriers are normally 
physical barriers or an activity called as safety critical activities. In NGL Plant most of the top 
events are loss of containment – hydrocarbon releases. Bow ties analysis provides list of safety 
critical elements and activities which need to be in place and further specification are prepared for 
its performance to prevent and mitigate consequences.  
Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) and Performance Standards 
Design performance standards are developed for each Safety Critical Elements (SCEs) identified 
from bow ties analysis. Performance standards include functionality, reliability/availability, 
survivability and dependability of safety critical element. These Performance standards shall align 
with specification developed for each SCEs. Process safety and risk studies such as fire and 
explosion analysis provide inputs to development of performance standards reliability/availability 
and survivability criteria. Assurance methods are also defined in performance standard for further 
assurance during Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) and Site Acceptance Test (SAT) etc. 
 
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) 
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Analysis (EERA) for onshore NGL facility is much simpler than 
for offshore facilities. EERA qualitatively examine and evaluate the effectiveness of EER facilities 
on onshore NGL Plant from major accident events which could occur during normal operations. 
This study identifies scenarios from fire and explosion analysis that would necessitate the use of 
the EER facilities. EERA shall determine the availability of escape routes from major accident 
event, and the potential impairment of EER facilities, when they are required. One of the main 
objectives of EERA is to check that defined EER goals and objectives are met, and if not, actions 
are generated to meet the goals. 
Health, Safety and Environmental Impact Assessment (HSEIA) 
The health, safety and environmental impact assessment (HSEIA) is a systematic approach for 
identifying the impact of new NGL Plant to health, safety and the environment. HSEIA report 
demonstrate compliance with HSE legislation; showing that all HSE hazards, including major 
accident hazards, occupational health hazards and environmental impact have been identified, 
assessed and mitigated. HSEIA report overall include the environmental impact assessment (EIA), 
a control of major accident hazards (COMAH) and an occupational health risk assessment 
(OHRA). Health, safety and environmental studies and assessment performed during the project 
are detailed in HSEIA Report to demonstrate that:  
 HSE Management System is in place for prevention of major accidents hazards  
 Health and safety hazards and environmental impacts have been identified, recorded and 
assessed 
 Environmental impacts and risks are managed 
 Safety critical equipment and systems are in place 
 Emergency plans have been prepared 
 The risks of project activities are ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable) 
HAZOP and SIL/ LOPA 
Prior to HAZOP and SIL/ LOPA design review meeting is conducted to review Process Flow 
Diagrams, Utility Flow Diagrams (UFDs), Process Description, Process and Instrumentation 
Diagrams (P&IDs), safeguarding / IPF narrative, Process Data Sheets, Site and Plant Layouts, 
Active and Passive Fire Protection Layouts, design documents and calculations. Process safety 
team active involvement in design review workshop provide valuable inputs to design 
development and further in preparation/achievement for other milestone activities.  
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and Safety Integrity Level (SIL)/Layer of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) are important milestone in detailed engineering for NGL Project. HAZOP can 
be conducted separately or in integration with SIL/LOPA for any project. These qualitative 
analysis followed by semi-quantitative exercise provides systematic identification of process 
hazards for different modes of operations which may go wrong due to failure of control system, 
human error or design errors. Identifying independent layer of protection (safeguards) and 
procedures to prevent failure resulting into serious consequences and further to assign 
reliability/availability targets for safety functions is important step in process safety management, 
inherent safety in design and operation of NGL Plant. Process safety team active participation in 
these important exercises are critical, since process safety and risk studies conducted prior to 
HAZOP, SIL/LOPA have significant inputs process hazard identification, defining consequences 
correctly and qualitatively assigning risk ranking as per project risk matrix with reference to Fire 
and Explosion Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA),  and other related risk studies. 
Project HSE Review (PHSER) 
Project HSE Review (PHSER) is an audit to assure that HSE activities and deliverables are 
performed systematically during detailed engineering phase of the project. PHSER identifies gaps 
with reference to project specification and standards in process safety deliverables/activities 
performed on the project and provide list of actions or mitigation measures to rectify or resolve 
within definite time period. During detail engineering phase of NGL Project, it is advisable to 
conduct PHSER at 30%, 60% and 90% Model review. Subsequent PHSER are conducted at 
Construction Stage, Pre-Start-up Stage and Operation Stage (~12 months after commissioning) of 
the project. 
Noise Analysis  
Noise analysis is an environmental deliverable and is performed on a project to show expected 
noise levels during normal operation and emergency conditions. During detailed engineering phase 
of NGL Project, noise mapping is performed considering vendors information of noise level from 
rotating equipment (which generates high noise) provides noise contours mapping indicating high 
noise areas and impact within plant premises and beyond site boundaries causing disturbance to 
nearby population and habitat. Noise mitigation measures are provided to prevent health impact to 
operators working in plant premises and surrounding population. 
Human Factor Engineering (HFE) 
Human Factor Engineering (HFE) during detailed engineering phase of the NGL project is to 
ensure the implementation of HFE principles in to the design as per project specification and 
international standards. HFE review during details engineering include the following. 
 Assure layout of packaged equipment has the appropriate level of HFE review 
 Provide structures work process to determine access and size requirement for elevated 
work areas 
 Provide structures work process to determine valve selection  
 Ensure that all controls and display/instruments and other operated machineries can be 
reached, operated and viewed effectively and safely by operators  
 Ensure that the need for safe and efficient maintenance tasks has been incorporated into 
design 
 Ensure that all areas of the plant and equipment can be assessed and evacuated safely and 
efficiently under normal, adverse and emergency conditions  
 Ensure that requirements for lifting, pulling and pushing of equipment, both manually and 
mechanically, have been considered bearing in mind the capabilities of expected user 
population  
 Ensure environmental requirements applicable to human health, safety and performance 
including noise, lighting, vibration, climatic conditions and proximity to hold, cold, 
hazardous and contaminated equipment or areas have been addressed 
 Ensure the ease and safety of construction operations  
HSE Action Tracking and Closeout 
HSE action tracking and closeout includes all risk and safety studies actions closeout with proper 
justification/evidence to ensure that actions generated are systematically reviewed, implemented 
and closed on the project. This continual exercise performed by process safety team provides 
assurance to the project management and is important step in Process Safety Management (PSM). 
Actions generated from HAZID, Fire and Explosion Analysis, QRA, HAZOP and SIL/LOPA, EIA, 
Bow ties, COMAH, HSEIA and other studies are included in this action tracking and closeout.  
Pre Start up Safety Review (PSSR) 
The most important and final requirement for managing process safety during detail engineering 
phase of NGL Plant is Pre Start-up Safety Review (PSSR). PSSR confirms that all health, safety, 
security, environmental and human factor requirements have been addressed satisfactorily and the 
facility is “ready to start-up”. 
Objectives of Pre Start up Safety Review (PSSR) are to ensure that 
 Facilities and equipment are built and installed in accordance with design standards  
 All operating procedures are developed and related process operator training are adequate 
and completed prior to the introduction of hazardous materials into the process 
 Safety reviews are conducted 
 All recommendations from HSE studies are implemented prior to start-up 
Pre Start-up Safety Review (PSSR) requires identifying, documenting and managing all start-ups 
from all type of shutdown during a process ensuring that all the HSE requirements have been 
analysed and the system is ready to start ensuring a safe environment. 
Conclusion  
Overall integration of all process safety studies and deliverables provide significant success to 
resolve complex issues arising during detailed engineering phase of NGL Project. Process safety 
and risk studies are so much related with engineering work performed by other engineering 
discipline, that awareness to remain proactive, participate and provide inputs when needed is 
essential for overall safety in design. Through knowledge and vigilance to keep track of inputs and 
outputs of each deliverables by process safety team in coordination with project team provides 
inherently safer NGL Plant.  
